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LIMITING RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
LIABILITY: A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING?
Tracy E. Higgins*
Introduction
Professor Neuborne's provocative essay1 on the future course of
the Human Rights Commission challenges us both to consider the
effective use of limited governmental resources and to rethink the
moral underpinnings of entity liability2 for human rights violations.
I shall first address his elaboration of the moral arguments concerning respondeat superior liability. I will conclude by suggesting
that, even if motivated by concern over limited resources, his proposal would have only a limited impact on employers and would
undermine significantly the remedial purpose of human rights
statutes.
I. Moral Ambiguity and the Persistence of Discrimination
In the opening paragraphs of his essay, Professor Neuborne refers to "the complexity and moral difficulty of third and fourth generation human rights issues."' 3 He explains that "[i]n first
generation human rights cases, where bigotry is blatant, the vast
bulk of American society rallies to a norm of decency. As issues
get more complex, especially when effective remedies will cause
real pain to many, support tends to erode for human rights."4 The
implication is that the Human Rights Commission might conserve
both its resources and its political capital by focusing on less controversial targets.
Although Professor Neuborne does not elaborate on this point,
it is worth considering the precise ways in which both discrimination and support for human rights enforcement have diminished
over time. It is true that the most blatant (and easily proved)
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B.,
Princeton University, 1986; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1990. I would like to thank my
colleague Russell Pearce for helpful comments, and Daniella Paul for excellent research assistance.
1. Burt Neuborne, Who's Afraid of the Human Rights Commission?, 23 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1139 (1996).
2. Neuborne defines classic entity liability as "respondeat superior liability on
employers for human rights violations committed by employees." Id. at 1145.
3. Id. at 1140.
4. Id.
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forms of racial discrimination are largely a thing of the past.5 However, other forms of blatant discrimination persist. Overt discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is generally accepted by
many and endorsed as sound public policy by some.6 The hostility
toward undocumented workers-and by extension legal immigrants-continues to generate a politically acceptable form of overt
discrimination.7 In such cases support for human rights enforcement may have declined, but the incidence of discrimination has
not.
Even though explicit job segregation on the basis of race and
gender has diminished, de facto job segregation is still an important
problem throughout the American workplace, significantly affecting the economic opportunities of men and women of color and
white women. For example, the unemployment rate among Afri8
can-Americans remains over twice that for white Americans.
Ninety-seven percent of senior managers in Fortune 1000 corporations are white men.9 Only 0.4% of senior management positions
in Fortune 1000 companies are Hispanic. 10 There are only two women CEO's in that group."' Closer to home, a study of lawyers
who graduated from the University of Michigan Law School during
the early 1970's reveals a significant wage gap between men and
women fifteen years after graduation. Although women earned
93.5% of men's salaries during the first year after graduation, by
5. Although I do not want to underestimate the progress that has been achieved
over the last decades in racial equality in this country, I hesitate to pronounce overt
racial hostility a thing of the past, especially in light of the recent rash of arson attacks
on African American Churches throughout the Southeast. See Emily Yellin, Burning
of Black Churches Tries the Souls of Southern Towns: For One Congregation,Trying to
Regain a Sense of Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1996, § 1, at 14.
6. For example, in his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, Patrick Buchanan pledged not to hire openly gay individuals to his cabinet. See Christopher Matthews, Buchanan: The Us Against Them GOP Candidate, S.F. EXAMINER,
Feb. 26, 1996, at Bl. But see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (striking down
amendment to Colorado constitution designed to eliminate civil rights protections for
gays and lesbians).
7. Anti-immigration sentiment helped fuel support for Buchanan's candidacy
and, along with opposition to affirmative action, was a key issue in California Governor Pete Wilson's short-lived candidacy for the Republican nomination. Although
Wilson failed to garner support for his presidential bid, Proposition 187, an anti-immigrant measure on the California ballot did pass. Similar legislation is pending in Congress. See James Sterngold, ParallelAgonizing Over Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 1996, § 1, at 8.
8. Good for Business: Making Full Use of the Nations' Human Capital: A FactFinding Report of the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, March 1995.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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year fifteen, women's earning had dropped to 61%. After controlling for grades, hours of work, family responsibilities, experience,
and choice of field, the earnings gap was still 13%.12
Perhaps the most direct evidence of continuing discrimination
comes from audit studies in which white and minority job seekers
are given similar resumes and sent to the same employers to apply
for jobs. These studies continue to reveal significant rates of discrimination: Employers are less likely to interview or offer a job to
men and women minority applicants and white women than to
white men. 13 Less direct evidence of the persistence of discrimination comes from comparing earnings of African-Americans and
whites, or men and women. Even after adjusting for characteristics
that affect earnings (such as years of education and work experience), studies show that African-American men and women are
paid significantly less than their white counterparts and that women generally earn less than men.' 4 The intersection of categories
of discrimination aggravates the disparity. For example, the average income for Hispanic women with college degrees5 is less than
the average for white men with high school degrees.'
President Clinton's recent review of affirmative action reported
that last year alone the federal government received over 90,000
complaints of employment discrimination.16 64,423 additional complaints were filed with state and local Fair Employment Practice
Commissions, bringing the total last year to over 154,000.17
Thousands of other individuals filed complaints alleging racially
motivated violence and discrimination in housing, voting, and public accommodations, just to name a few. 8 For most of the claims,
neither the moral clarity of the cause nor the importance of a remedy has diminished.' 9
12. See Robert Wood et al., Pay Differentials Among the Highly Paid: The MaleFemale Earnings Gap in Lawyer's Salaries, J. LABOR ECON. (July, 1993).
13. See, e.g., David Neumark et al., Sex Discriminationin Restaurant Hiring:An
Audit Study, NBER Working Paper No. 5024 (1995).
14. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, THE STATUS OF EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE (1995).

15. Id.
16. Affirmative Action Review: Report to the President21 (1995).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. At the Symposium, Professor Neuborne clarified his reference to the moral
complexity of human rights standards by focusing on the controversy over affirmative
action and the fairness of imposing a burden on a particular subset of workers to

remedy societal discrimination generally. Certainly affirmative action has become
highly controversial; however, most human rights claims do not involve the so-called
reverse discrimination of affirmative action but rather traditional discrimination. The

1184

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
II. A Modest Proposal

A.

The "Problem" of Overdeterrence

Although I am less convinced than Professor Neuborne that
human rights claims have become more morally complex, I agree
that reexamining our processes for adjudicating and remedying
such claims is a worthwhile endeavor. It is this reexamination that
leads Professor Neuborne to question the efficacy of damage
awards either to compensate the victim or to deter illegal conduct.
Focusing on the connection between "post-event sanctions" and
pre-event behavior, he criticizes our current reliance on the deterrence value of damage awards. He writes:
Instead of expending significant resources to alter pre-event behavior by education, inducement or amelioration, we often drift
into a post-event mentality, expending huge sums on detection,
adjudication, collection and human warehousing in the hope
that fear of post-event sanctions will deter unwanted pre-event
behavior.2"
Professor Neuborne offers as an example of this danger our current
war on drugs, in his words, "a failed enterprise that pours vast resources into an effort to stop drug use by focusing almost exclusively on post-event sanctions."'" He also cites the effort to deal
with illegitimacy by cutting off welfare payments.2 2
I find these two examples interesting in the context of a discussion of anti-discrimination law because, unlike civil rights cases, the
consequences of overdeterrence in the examples are visited disproportionately on people on the margins of political power. This is
not generally true, of course, when we focus on the purported risks
of overdeterrence that civil rights enforcement poses to employers.23 The targets of overzealous enforcement are not inner-city
youth facing harsh sentences for selling small amounts of drugs or
welfare mothers punished for exercising their reproductive choice.
remedies sought by plaintiffs do not address societal discrimination but specific,
targeted acts against individuals.
20. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1142.
21. Id. at 1142-43.
22. Id. at 1142 n.12.
23. One qualification shoild be made: To the extent that penalties in promotion
cases are larger and more cdrin than in failure to hire cases, employers are less
likely to hire protected work~rs. See John J. Donohue III and Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Emptoytnent Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983
(1991). In this sense, the consequences of zealous enforcement of the rights of one
group of minority workers (those denied promotion) are visited indirectly on another
class of minority workers (those seeking employment).
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Rather, the targets of purported overzealous enforcement are corporations. This might explain why Professor Neuborne is not able
to cite any concrete examples or data that tend to establish that

such overzealous enforcement is happening in civil rights cases.24
To the extent that post-event sanctions do not properly deter preevent conduct, it is more likely due to under- rather than over-

enforcement.
B.

Employers, Employees, and the Division of Responsibility

Although I am not convinced that we face any particular risk of
overdeterrence or distortion of the purposes of human rights, I do
believe that it is worth asking whether we might modify our system
of incentives and sanctions to increase its deterrent value without
significantly diminishing its compensatory value. To this end, Professor Neuborne suggests that, at least for cases brought by the

human rights commission,2 5 responsibility should be placed primarily upon the actor who commits the violation and only secondarily

on the entity (whether public or private) that employs the actor.
Moreover, that entity would bear derivative liability only in the absence of a commission-approved plan designed to prevent violations of human rights.26
Professor Neuborne makes practical as well as moral arguments
in support of his proposal. I shall focus first on the former. As to
the first component of the proposal, imposing liability on the individual wrongdoer, I agree that a strong moral argument can be
24. Of course, examples abound of employers complaining that they are the victims of false accusations of discrimination, and the media is more than willing to publicize such complaints by focusing on the occasional high damage award in a marginal
case. See, e.g., Dominic Bencivenga, Glass Ceiling Verdict: Employment Bar Jolted by
$5 Million Award, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 1995, at 5. Nevertheless, careful studies of damage awards in civil rights cases reveal that they are quite low relative to average
awards in personal injury cases generally. See, e.g., Shea and Gardner, Analysis of
Damage Awards Under Section 1981, (reviewing and documenting the low level of
damages awards in section 1981 cases during the 1980s) [unpublished report on file
with the author]; Securities Industry Employers Usually Winners in Discrimination

Claims, 1996

DAILY LABOR REPORT

49 (Mar. 13, 1996) (noting that employers won

between 60 and 70 percent of discrimination claims arbitrated in the securities industry over the past 5 years).
25. Professor Neuborne suggests that his proposal may not apply to suits brought
by plaintiffs represented by private lawyers. But, it is not clear how such an affirmative defense will have the desired effect if limited to a single enforcement mechanism.
Given the variety of sources of law governing these violations, such a limitation would
lead to the worst sort of forum-shopping in which the availability of the forum depends upon the resources of the injured party. See infra at 1193.
26. Professor Neuborne says very little about what such a plan might look like and
how it might be approved.
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made.27 Professor Neuborne makes this case most effectively by

offering four examples of egregious acts by groups or individuals in

violation of an individual employee's human rights.28 He then asks
why the employer and not the perpetrator of the bad acts should
be held legally liable.

In such cases, when an injured employee can establish employer
liability under human rights laws, she will often bring a claim
against the employer directly, whether or not the individual wrongdoer might be held personally liable.2 9 Although in theory the employer may be permitted to seek reimbursement from the
individual employee wrongdoer, the employer will often decide,

for the same reasons the individual plaintiff chose not to sue that
individual, that the recovery is not worth the effort.3 ° If both the

plaintiff-employee and the employer choose not to pursue the individual perpetrator, that individual will not be held accountable for
his actions. In short, his bad acts will go unpunished. I agree with
Professor Neuborne that this is a bad result. The individual wrongdoer ought not to escape financial responsibility for his acts by
shifting responsibility to the employer. Thus, I would support a
27. One reservation I have with respect to this aspect of Professor Neuborne's
proposal is that it has the effect of dividing lower-ranking workers, pitting them
against each other and reducing worker solidarity. One manifestation of this effect is
the struggle within unions over a union's responsibility to workers involved in coworker sexual harassment claims. See Leslye M. Fraser, Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: Conflicts Employers May Face Between Title VII's Reasonable Woman
Standardand Arbitration Principles,20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 20 (1992)
(noting that arbitrator may refuse, on grounds of industrial due process, to enforce
employer's decision to discharge employee and may reinstate employee or reduce
discharge to suspension); Douglas E. Ray, Sexual Harassment,Labor Arbitration and
National Labor Policy, 73 NEB. L. REV. 812, 815 (1994) (arguing for the need for
judicial review of arbitration awards in light of the conflict among workers, plaintiffs,
and employers). See also Marion C. Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the
Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1167 (1991) (discussing
similar emerging problems in the context of union protection of workers).
28. Neuborne, supra note 1,at 1161-62.
29. The degree to the which the individual perpetrator can be held legally liable
directly to the injured party (as opposed to derivatively to the employer) varies. Title
VII gives plaintiffs a cause of action only against the employer. See Tomka v. Seiler,
66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995). However, common law tort claims or state statutory claims may be available against the individual. See id. at 1312-13 (construing
section 296 of the New York Human Rights Law to allow discrimination claims to be
asserted against individuals). For a discussion of the implications of this decision, see
Bertrand C. Sellier and Felice J. Batlan, IndividualLiability for Employment Discrimination, N.Y. L.J., Jan.-4, 1996, at 1.
30. See Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1145 n.16; Sellier and Batlan, supra note 29
(noting power of employees to pressure employers to settle suits when individual employees are named as defendants).
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system by which a portion of the principal liability is imposed on
the wrongdoer himself.
Despite my general agreement with the first component of Professor Neuborne's proposal, I do not think that the second necessarily follows. Imposing liability directly on the individual
wrongdoer does not require a shifting of direct liability away from
employers altogether. At best, an employer should be understood
as sharing responsibility with the individual discriminators in his
employ. Professor Neuborne suggests, however, that employer liability should be considered only if the perpetrator is unable fully to
compensate the victim. 31 In such a case of inadequate compensation, the employer should be held liable if the employer is itself
morally culpable. 32 If, however, the employer is not morally culpable, the employer should be liable only in the absence of a commission-approved plan.33 This neat formulation avoids the
fundamental question at stake in every case in which employer liability is alleged: What does it mean for an employer to be morally
responsible?
Professor Neuborne's theory turns on accepting the notion that
the employer's liability for discriminatory acts of his employees is
respondeat superior liability-that is, derivative rather than direct
liability. Yet, describing the bulk of employer liability as derivative
misconceives the issue in this sense: it posits a false separation between the employer (usually a corporate entity consisting of individuals with a range of interests from workers, to managers, to
shareholders) and the people in the position to commit discriminatory acts.
Support for this conceptual separation of employer and employee tortfeasors can be found in traditional agency principles
governing a master's derivative liability for the torts of his servants.
According to common law agency principles, the master "is not
subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment. ' 34 For torts committed within the
scope of employment, the doctrine of respondeat superior, literally
"let the master answer, '35 is invoked. These principles grew out of
a conception of the employer and employee (master and servant),
31. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1146.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).

35. Id. at § 219(1).
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as two individuals between whom moral and legal culpability could
be divided.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 36 the Supreme Court specifically imported agency principles into Title VII doctrine, adopting
the argument made by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in its amicus brief.37 Without providing much guidance,
the Supreme Court seemed to rule out both the imposition of strict
liability on the employer for acts of its employees 38 and the position that an official policy and grievance procedure could insulate
the employer from liability when a victim fails to invoke such procedures. 39 In support of its ill-defined middle position, the Court
explained that "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include
any 'agent' of an employer, surely evinces an intent to place some
limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title
VII are to be held responsible. ' 40 Thus, the Supreme Court's treatment of employer liability, at least in the context of hostile work
environment sexual harassment, 41 reflects an agency-inspired separation of the employer and its employee-agents, whether supervisors or co-workers.
Notwithstanding the Meritor decision, I believe that invocation
of this tort-based conception is problematic in the context of employment discrimination for at least two reasons. First, discrimination is not a tort in the traditional sense. Anti-discrimination law
does not impose a duty that an employer can discharge by taking
the appropriate level of care.42 Conversely, a finding of employer
liability does not necessarily imply a finding of fault in the traditional tort-based sense. Properly understood, anti-discrimination
statutes define a right of the employee to be free from the harm of
discrimination. The focus is on remedying the consequences to the
employee-victim, not on the moral fault of the employer. Thus, in
36. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
37. It is worth noting that this brief was filed by the E.E.O.C. under Clarence

Thomas; however, the agency's position in Meritor was inconsistent with its earlier
position reflected in its guidelines. Under the E.E.O.C. guidelines at the time of the
Meritor decision the employer was deemed liable for the acts of its agents without
regard to the employer's notice of those actions. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985).
38. 477 U.S. at 72.
39. 477 U.S. at 73.
40. 477 U.S. at 72.

41. Under current federal law, an employer is directly liable for all discriminatory
acts committed by employees except for harassment. In other words, when a supervisor discriminates in hiring, wages, hours, or working conditions, the employer is liable
whether or not the employer approved, knew, or should have known about the action.
See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
42. See id.

STAN.

L.

REV.

813, 853 (1991).
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disparate impact cases, we impose liability even absent any showing of discriminatory intent.4 3 The employer must compensate victims for the discriminatory consequences, whether or not the
employer intended or anticipated those consequences.
Second, whatever the problems of using tort principles generally
to interpret anti-discrimination law, the relationship between the
employer and employee is considerably more complicated than the
master/servant relationship that gave rise to the principles of respondeat superior. For example, when may relationships among
employees be understood as employer/employee relationships?
When an employee discriminates against another employee (or potential employee), he acts both on behalf of and, in an important
sense, as the employer.' He incurs liability as the employer in a
direct rather than a derivative sense. This seems certainly appropriate when the employee acts by virtue of power derived from his
position within the corporate entity.
I will grant that the issue of employer liability is more complex
when the discriminator is in a nonhierarchical relationship with the
discriminatee. Increasingly, hostile environment sexual harassment cases involve this situation. In such cases, a majority of
courts, following Meritor, have imposed liability on the employer
only when the employer knew or should have known about the
harassing conduct.4 5 This is the context in federal employment discrimination law that most nearly approaches the framework for
employer liability that Professor Neuborne suggests. Under current case law, in hostile work environment cases involving coworkers, an employer may be able to cut off respondeat superior
liability by creating mechanisms within the workplace to encourage

43. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
44. This problem has been recognized by lower courts attempting to apply the

agency principles of Meritor. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held that an employer will be liable for the acts of the supervisor when the supervisor's authority is
delegated by the employer. See Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d
900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557

(11th Cir. 1987). In such situations, the supervisor acts as the employer. See Huddleston, 845 F.2d at 904.

45. See, e.g., Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91$ F.2d 463, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1990)
(focusing on actual or constructive knowledge); Spark, 830 F.2d at 1557 (requiring
that plaintiff show that employer knew or should ha* known about the harassment
and failed to take remedial action); Huddleston, 845 F.2d at 904 (interpreting Meritor

as imposing a negligence standard requiring actual or constructive knowledge).

1190

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII

reporting of sexual harassment and then demonstrate that they
were not utilized.46
It is no coincidence therefore that three of the four cases Professor Neuborne cites in support of his proposal to separate "perpetrator" liability from "entity liability" involve sexual harassment
allegations. In sexual or racial harassment cases, the argument that
the employee is acting outside the scope of his employment is at its
most compelling. After all, in what sense is harassment ever within
the scope of an individual's employment? In such cases, a negligence standard-the employer know or should have known of the
conduct-is arguably an appropriate prerequisite to employer liability. Professor Neubome's proposal, however, would extend a
version of this respondeat superior analysis beyond hostile environment harassment cases to all cases of workplace discrimination
brought by the human rights commission.
III. Discrimination in the Modern Private Workplace
Professor Neubome's proposal to shield the employer from liability if the employer had adopted a Commission-approved plan
for preventing discrimination is potentially radical and far-reaching.4 7 Yet, the scope of his proposal is not particularly clear. At
the end of his article, Professor Neuborne adds the limitation that
he would cut off respondeat superior liability only in cases where
the employer is not morally responsible; however, he offers no suggestions as to what such a case might look like. Through a series of
examples of my own, I want to explore briefly what it means for
the employer to be morally responsible. Drawing that line should
tell us the degree to which Professor Neuborne's proposal departs
from current law and what the costs of such a departure might be.
Consider the following cases:
1. Company policy is "African Americans need not apply."
Professor Neuborne correctly observes that this is a type of discrimination that is rarely seen in today's workplace (except perhaps discrimination based on sexual orientation). If this were the
company policy, presumably the employer (meaning the company
46. The Supreme Court seemed to suggest as much in Meritorbut made clear that
procedures in place must have been reasonably calculated to encourage reporting of
the conduct. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73.
47. Once again, Professor Neuborne offers very little in the way of describing the
possible requirements of such a plan; however, if the discriminator is found liable,
then the plan failed on this occasion despite Commission certification.
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itself) would be directly liable for damages. In this sense, the case
is analogous to the public employment context.48
2. White hiring manager refuses to hire African Americans, resulting in an all-white work force. Here the policy derives from the
discriminatory inclinations of a white manager, not an explicit company policy. Presumably, under Professor Neuborne's scheme, this
type of case would lead to liability imposed on the individual
wrongdoer and on the company-employer for one of two reasons:
First, the employer may be deemed morally responsible because of
his knowledge of the discriminatory hiring pattern. Second, the
employer may be held liable because, under a properly-functioning
Commission-approved plan, such a pattern could not exist.
3. Based on his own racist attitudes,a white managerpasses over
an African American employee for a promotion. Instead, he promotes an equally qualified white employee. Here the pattern of hiring and promotion might not be apparent to the employer. We
cannot assume that knowledge of the discriminatory decision extends beyond the individual supervisor. Is this a case in which we
can say the employer is morally responsible? Or, is the employer's
liability here merely derivative? Should the manager's actions be
understood as actions of the employer? Surely racially discriminatory hiring is not within the scope of the manager's job in the traditional sense.
Perhaps this is a case in which, under Professor Neuborne's
scheme, the plaintiff's recovery would be limited to the individual
discriminator, not the company, assuming that the employer has a
properly functioning, Commission-approved plan. On the other
hand, if we assume that it is impossible for a discriminatory act of
this sort to have occurred under a properly functioning plan, Professor Neuborne's scheme offers no greater protection to the employer than the current scheme under title VII and therefore no
greater reward for taking preventive action.
4. Co-workers consistently engage in racially threatening and insulting behavior toward African American workers. Here again we
might hold the co-workers principally liable and seek compensation from the company only secondarily. Under title VII, an employer will be liable if he "knew or should have known" of the
harassing conduct. If, under Professor Neuborne's scheme, the
company can avoid this liability by having in place a Commissionapproved plan, the plaintiff is undercompensated. After all, the
48. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1155-56 (discussion of public employment).
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discriminatory acts occurred despite the existence of a plan. If, on
the other hand, we take the occurrence of discrimination as evidence of the inadequacy of the plan, once again, Professor
Neuborne's model offers no greater protection than existing law.
My point in these examples is to demonstrate that the degree to
which Professor Neuborne's scheme increases the employer's incentive to take preventive action is precisely the degree to which it
decreases the plaintiff's compensation. Simply stated, under current law, employers who want to avoid discrimination can put in
place an excellent anti-discrimination plan and thereby reduce the
amount of discrimination. Their incentive to do so is the economic
gain they will enjoy by avoiding potential damage awards in those
discrimination suits avoided by eliminating discriminatory acts.
Under current federal law, however, employers still have to pay
when their plan fails and discrimination occurs.4 9

Under Professor Neuborne's proposal, in contrast, employers
who have an excellent, Commission-approved, plan in place would
not have to pay even when it fails (as it inevitably will on occasion).
Thus, plaintiffs are somewhat undercompensated, but employers
have an added incentive to create such plans. That plaintiff compensation will be diminished should not lead us necessarily to reject the proposal. Nevertheless, by focusing on the consequences
to the plaintiff, we can re-frame the initial question concerning the
effective use of commission resources: Do the gains likely to be
achieved by increasing employer incentives to prevent discrimination outweigh the costs of undercompensating plaintiffs who suffer
injury 'when such plans fail?
IV.

Practical Considerations in a Less Than Ideal World

Having committed much of his professional life to the cause of
civil rights, Professor Neuborne offers his proposal in response to a

urgent need to make the best use of contracting resources. These
questions are indeed pressing and worthy of serious consideration.
How do we increase employers' incentive to prevent discrimination

in an imperfect world of limited resources? Can we make better
use of deterrence and enforcement dollars? It is in a spirit of pragmatic reflection that Professor Neuborne offers several practical
49. The Court alluded to a possible exception to this general rule in Meritor. If an
employer has in place a plan that is well-calculated to prevent hostile environment
sexual harassment and to encourage the reporting of such incidents, an employer
might not be deemed liable for unreported acts of harassment. See Meritor,477 U.S.
at 72-73.
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considerations in support of his proposal. I find these practical
considerations more convincing than his moral arguments about
employer liability. Nevertheless, even in the face of serious budgetary constraints, I am not persuaded of the wisdom of the proposed safe harbor provision for employers. Thus, in conclusion, I
examine the likely effect of the components of Professor
Neuborne's proposal and offer my own practical reasons for offering only partial support.
1. Shifting primary liability to the offending individual. Under
current law, the employer has an incentive to reduce the incidence
of discrimination as much as possible by policing personnel and
firing discriminators. Shifting the primary responsibility to the individual discriminator reduces the employer's incentive somewhat,
but it does so in a constructive way. It places the burden on the
party in the best position to avoid the harmful conduct-the individual making discriminatory decisions.
2. Shielding employers from respondeat superior liability
through a Commission-approved plan. There are advantages to
this scheme-employers are encouraged to take particular types of
steps to avoid discrimination. The Commission can encourage positive and creative steps such as educational programs and worker
training rather than ham-fisted steps designed to avoid liability
rather discrimination. Nevertheless, the costs to such a scheme
must also be considered and those costs are paid by plaintiffs. I am
not convinced that the benefits of managed prevention would outweigh the undercompensation of individuals harmed by
discrimination.
3. Making the best use of the resources of the Commission. If
Professor Neuborne's proposal is limited to cases brought before
the Commission, it is not likely to have much effect on employer
conduct-private law suits are still very much a possibility and the
employer would not be shielded from liability in those cases. On
the other hand, to the extent that it has an effect, this effect, as I
have argued, depends on reducing plaintiffs' compensation. If this
cost is imposed only on plaintiffs who file their cases with the Commission, plaintiffs who can afford private attorneys will simply seek
a forum that will be able to give them complete relief. The proposal would thus lead to the worst kind of forum-shopping-the kind
in which the adequacy of relief depends on the victim's ability to
pay.
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Conclusion
Notwithstanding any gains in deterrence that might be wrought
by manipulating the parameters of employer liability for worker
conduct, Professor Neuborne's proposal sends a troubling message
about employers' responsibility for workplace conditions. By reinforcing the idea that discrimination is a harm that is principally
committed by one individual against another, the proposal treats it
as an isolated wrong rather than a condition that must be combatted in a sustained way throughout the workplace. The adoption of
a Commission-approved plan is an important step for an employer
to take in controlling discrimination; however, holding the employer responsible for discriminatory harm to its employees provides a necessary incentive for innovation in the struggle to
eliminate bias on the job. More importantly, imposing shared liability emphasizes that that struggle belongs to us all.

